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GROUP ACTIONS IN SWEDEN: REFLECTIONS
ON THE PURPOSE OF CIVIL LITIGATION,
THE NEED FOR REFORMS, AND A
FORTHCOMING PROPOSAL
ROBERTH NORDH*
I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
The post-industrial society of today is characterized in several re-
spects by social, industrial, commercial, and environmental structures,
which are different from those that existed when the legislation in
many fields was created.  In Sweden this is true in particular when it
comes to rules within the field of procedural law.  The Swedish Code
of Judicial Procedure was enacted in 1948, and although it has been
reformed several times since then, the procedural rules are still to a
great extent shaped without sufficient regard for the fact that the cir-
cumstances of contemporary society are different from those that ap-
plied when the Code was enacted.1
Thus, contemporary society has given rise to new forms of needs
and claims that were unknown fifty years ago.  For instance, devel-
opments in the consumer and environmental fields have given rise to
claims that, since they affect so many people in the same way, would
be better addressed at the group level rather than at the more tradi-
tional individual level.  It is not possible to satisfy the needs of con-
sumers and the environment solely by provisions that give private
citizens a means of exacting sanctions should they be subject to a
violation of their rights. Further legal rules are called for in order to
Copyright  2001 by Roberth Nordh.
* Roberth Nordh, LL.D., is Judge of Appeal, Vice Head of Division, at the Appeal Court
for Skåne and Blekinge, Malmö, Sweden.  This Article is based on the Author’s work as Secre-
tary to the Swedish Commission for Group Actions (1991-1995) and for the Ministry of Justice
(1999-2001) to form an Act on Group Actions in general courts in Sweden.
1. See, e.g., Per Henrik Lindblom, Rättegångsbalken 50 år – en saga och sex sanningar [The
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure – One Fairy-tale and six True Stories] Svensk juristtidning
[SvJT] 496 (1999).
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permit the common processing of mass claims and to protect public
consumer and environmental interests.
Examples of new types of claims are those that derive from
rather generally formulated social goals or rights, for example, the
right to a healthy environment and to protection from discrimination
or unconstitutional contravention of civil rights.  These are issues
concerning rights and claims held in common by all citizens or by
large sections of the population.
It is not, however, only in situations of this kind that group inter-
ests, which are difficult to define and protect, arise.  Other situations
such as an accident, a dangerous product, dishonest business methods,
or a discharge from an environmentally dangerous activity, may also
injure many persons in a similar manner, thereby creating a tempo-
rary group of people with similar claims against a particular company
or public utility.
The question of access to justice for modern mass claims raises a
number of new procedural issues and problems.  This is due not only
to the fact that these kinds of claims affect large interest groups, but
also because they are sometimes based on very pronounced social and
political considerations.  The legal review of these claims involves
balancing a broad spectrum of interests. The claims, consequently, do
not lend themselves to being arranged within individual procedural
models formulated decades ago.
Problems associated with litigation apply to new as well as tradi-
tional kinds of claims. The difficulties of seeking redress are con-
nected to both the content of the substantive law and to economic,
psychological, cognitive, and social obstacles affecting the individual
claimant facing a party who may, in several respects, be stronger.2
This problem may be virtually insurmountable, as the system of pro-
cedural rules is aimed at satisfying traditionally narrow two-party dis-
putes.  On top of this, the effectiveness of proceedings is inadequate
in certain areas, even in relation to litigation between equal parties.
In the past ten to fifteen years, issues concerning citizens’ access
to the machinery of justice have been afforded greater attention and
interest by lawyers, political commentators, politicians, and other
members of Swedish society.  Group actions and other forms of rep-
resentative actions have come to be viewed in Sweden, as in other
countries, as a means of strengthening access to justice for claims that
2. Cf. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
239-46 (1989).
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are held in common with, or are similar for, a large number of peo-
ple.3
Thus, proposals to introduce group actions or to investigate the
possibilities for such reformatory measures have been put forward
several times.4  Of great importance in this context is the fact that in
June 1991 the Swedish Government appointed Professor Lindblom to
lead a commission with the task of examining whether there is a
manifest need to improve access to justice for group claims.5  The
Commission was to assess the possibility of introducing rules, as a
complement to the traditional rules of judicial procedure, for group
actions in situations concerning claims that are common to large
groups of people.  In January 1995 the Commission presented its ex-
tensive report. 6
The Report was sent out for review to more than sixty official
and private entities, for example, courts, the Bar Association, the
Consumer Ombudsman, and non-governmental organizations.  Reac-
tions varied.  Not surprisingly, there was strong support for reform
from representatives for consumers and the environment, while those
3. The most experienced observer in this field is Per Henrik Lindblom, Professor of Civil
and Criminal Procedure at Uppsala University.  See, e.g., PER HENRIK LINDBLOM, Grupptalan. En
studie av det amerikanska classactioninstitutet ur ett svenskt perspektiv [Group Actions. The An-
glo-American Class Action from a Swedish Perspective] (With a Summary in English) (1989)(on
file with Author); Per Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Per-
spective and Proposal on Group Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (1997).
4. See generally Statens Offentliga Utredningar [Reports of the Government Commis-
sions] SOU 1989:14, Part II, Mångfald mot enfald – Lagstiftning och rättsfrågor [Diversity or
Uniformity]; SOU 1993:27, Miljöbalk - förslag till åtgärder för ett framtida miljöskyddsarbete
[The Environment Code]; SOU 1993:59, Ny Marknadsföringslag [New Marketing Practices
Act]; SOU 1993:7, Löneskillnader och lönediskriminering – Om kvinnor och män på ar-
betsmarknaden, [Pay Differentials and Pay Discrimination]; Departementsstencil [Department
Report] [Ds] 1993:16, Avgifter inom kommunal verksamhet – förslag till  modifierad självkost-
nadsprincip [Charges and Levies for Municipal Services] (all on file with author).  It may also be
mentioned that the Swedish Parliament has, on several occasions, dealt with issues of representa-
tive actions by organizations in the field of environmental law. E.g,. Jordbruksutskottets
betänkande [Department of Agriculture’s Report] [JoU] 1980/81:21 and 1982/83:30.  The Parlia-
ment has also considered the issue of group actions as a means of strengthening the effectiveness of
the prohibition of discrimination in the Equal Opportunities Act.  E.g., Proposition [Government
Bill] [Prop.]1993/94:147 and Arbetsmarknadsutkottets betänkande [Committee on Labour Market
Report] [AU] 1993/94:17.  Cf. SOU 1978:40, Tivstelösning på konsumentområdet [The Resolution
of Disputes in the Field of Consumer Protection]; SOU 1994:14 Konsumentpolitik i en ny tid [Con-
sumer Policy in the New Age](all on file with author).
5. The Commission consisted of several representatives for business life, non-
governmental organizations, and public entities.
6. See Gupprättegång Del A-C, SOU 1994:151[Class Action Part A-C, SOU 1994:151].
The Report is in three parts and contains almost 1,500 pages (on file with author).
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representing industry were against the introduction of group actions
into Swedish law.
The criticism focused on three main issues, namely, the interest
of the members of the group of claimants, of the defendant, and of
the courts.7  Thus, the critics’ concern was that group actions would
deprive the individual members of the group of their right to a day in
court.8  Under this argument, group actions are viewed to be unconsti-
tutional.  Furthermore, critics said that group actions would force an
individual defendant to accept unjust settlements.9  In this way, it is
argued, group actions will create a risk of legal blackmail.10  Finally,
the critics said that the courts would overflow with group actions—al-
though there is no need for such actions—and thereby hinder other
judicial activity in the courts.11
The Swedish Ministry of Justice took the responses into consid-
eration, and in the late summer of 1999, the Ministry of Justice de-
cided to move on and convert the Commission’s proposal into legisla-
tion.  The proposed Act, however, was considered much too
extensive,12 partly explained by the fact that the Commission also
chose to regulate issues that occur infrequently in practice.  There-
fore, in November of last year, the Author of this Article was asked
by the Ministry of Justice to review the Commission’s proposal.  In
March 2000, I presented to the Ministry of Justice a revised draft leg-
islation.13  According to a statement made by the Government in a
7. See Per Henrik Lindblom, Grupptryck mot grupptalan [Group Pressure against Group
Action] SvJT 85 (1996) (on file with author).
8. See id. at 97.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 101.
11. These arguments are well known all around the world and are put forward whenever a
proposition of introducing group actions or improving existing rules on group procedure is pre-
sented. But the fact that the arguments are repeated over and over again does not make them
stronger. On the contrary, experience from, inter alia, Canada and Australia shows that the fear
of legal blackmail and a floodgate effect on the courts is ill-founded and far from verified in
practice. This was confirmed by reports by Professor Garry D. Watson and Dr. Peter Cashman
presented at the Conference, “Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective,”
Geneva, July 21-22, 2000.  See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11
DUKE J. COMP. &  INT’L L. 269 (2001); S. Stuart Clark & Christina Harris, Multi-Plaintiff Liti-
gation in Australia: A Comparative Perspective, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &  INT’L L. 289 (2001).
12. The draft legislation presented by the Commission contains nearly 100 sections.
13. In the new proposal the Act is reduced to 49 sections (not yet published, on file with
author).
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paper presented before the Swedish Parliament in April 2000,14 new
legislation on group actions may be introduced in the beginning of
2001.  This was confirmed in a proposition made to the Parliament in
September 2000.15
The main purpose of this Article is to present the proposed leg-
islation as it stands today.  However, I would like to begin with some
views on the underlying need for a group action reform. Therefore, in
the next two sections I will discuss the purpose and function of the le-
gal system and civil proceedings, as well as various barriers to access
to justice for mass claims.
II.  SOME REMARKS ON THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF
THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
In order to survive, every society requires that its members ob-
serve certain given behavioral patterns.  A democratic social system is
founded on people’s desire and inclination to cooperate in order to
achieve common, socially useful net benefits.  In order to be accepted
by the citizens, the rules of behavior must be directed towards common
goals.  The advantages gained by observance of given behavioral
norms, together with the respective sanctions applicable upon breach
of them, contributes to the maintenance of social institutions.  In this
way, guarantees are provided for the continued development of society
in accordance with decisions made within a democratic political system.
In order to achieve these objectives, in many cases the behavioral
norms need to be coupled with sanctions that will apply against those
who fail to observe the provisions.  Indeed, many people surely feel
that they have a duty to submit to decisions made in a democratic pro-
cess.  Most people obey the law without considering the possible legal
consequences of breaking the rules.  For others, however, the threat of
sanctions is an important factor influencing their choice among alterna-
tive forms of behavior. In many areas it is possible to show strong links
between effective sanctions and the inclination to contravene rules.
Compliance with the law is not promoted if it is not possible to impose
sanctions for violations of rules. This may diminish the feeling of duty
to obey legal rules; citizens lose confidence and, ultimately, their faith
in the law.
14. Regeringens skrivelser [Communication from the Government] [Skr.] 1999/2000:106,
available at <http://www.justitie.regeringen.se/propositionermm/skrivelser/pdf/s19992000_106.
pdf>.
15. Prop. 2000/2001:1 p 37 available at <http://www.finans.regeringen.se/propositionermm/
bp01/pdf/BP2001.pdf>
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For legal systems utilized to give effect to substantive law, it is a
common requirement that they should be constructed in a manner that
guarantees an effective and just intervention.  The overall objective is
to enforce and assure the content of the substantive legal rules.  It may
appear to be a banal truth, but it is nevertheless worth stating: a system
of sanctions must be founded on the fundamental principle that an act
or ordinance is passed with the view that its content shall be observed
and that its sanctions are enforceable.
The machinery used to impose sanctions may be constructed in
many ways.  The alternatives include judicial or administrative exami-
nation and control, private or public boards, arbitration, etc.  Public
and private alternatives may prove equally effective in ensuring that a
private person can enforce his rights, or in executing a means of com-
pulsion.  Although private alternatives to courts and other official op-
erations may constitute efficient and effective instruments to uphold
the rights of private persons, it is the State that must bear the responsi-
bility of ensuring that citizens have access to enforceable forms of sanc-
tions.  It is difficult to conceive of a private administration of law based
on anything other than the parties’ voluntary submission to such ex-
amination.  Therefore, there can hardly be any question of permitting
private agencies to control the means of compulsion necessary for a
completely effective sanctions system.
There is a risk that respect for the legal system will diminish if the
legislator does not provide means for private persons to enforce their
claims by compulsion.  The inclination of a party to voluntarily submit
to determination by a private alternative is probably dependent upon
the options offered by the State.  Furthermore, the possibility of en-
forcing a right by means of State compulsion is an important induce-
ment to voluntary submission to another form of determination that of-
fers a simpler and less expensive procedure.
The option of undertaking court proceedings is the most impor-
tant dispute resolution alternative provided by the State.  The courts
have a constitutional base that affords them a special status in the ad-
ministration of law and justice.  Their procedures are founded on the
principles of due process, whereby the court must be objective and im-
partial, and the decisions must be made uniform for similar cases.
When acting judicially, the courts are not subject to State control, and
they serve as the final means for ensuring that the rights of private per-
sons are also upheld in relation to the State.
The procedural rules, and the actual proceedings, are thus of fun-
damental importance to the effectiveness of the substantive law.  This
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also applies to the possibility of compelling enforcement.  The proce-
dural system should be structured both in accordance with the re-
quirement that the decisions be correct in substance, and also so that
the procedure shall act as a behavior modifier.  The litigation proce-
dure should facilitate the resolution of a dispute in a manner that does
not under-compensate or over-compensate any party,16 while the deci-
sion of the court should discourage actions that violate the law.  This,
however, is not enough.  A system of procedural rules should also pro-
vide satisfactory economical solutions to litigation.  Further, it should
provide the courts with the opportunity to establish case law and to de-
velop the law, a function that the substantive law more and more fre-
quently calls for, especially within the fields of consumer law and envi-
ronmental law.
There is good reason to speak of a Swedish model in relation to
the creation of systems to deal with legal conflicts.  The tendency has
largely been towards the specialization of the organs concerned with
legal sanctions.  The specialization has sometimes been within the
courts’ administration, and in other situations the establishment of spe-
cial boards, agencies, etc., has affected it.  In certain cases, endeavors
have primarily been directed toward the resolution of disputes by vol-
untary agreements.  The legal institutions have thus been concerned
with providing supplementary assistance and developing the law.
The era of specialization seems, however, to have passed its peak
in Sweden.  Current developments tend toward more institutions being
combined or in some other way coordinated with each other.17  Simul-
taneously, work is under way to limit the functions of the courts so that
they may devote more attention to their principal function, namely, the
administration of justice in the true sense.  Furthermore, the general
courts have come to play a greater role in society as a result of Swedish
membership in the EU.
III.  ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR MASS CLAIMS
A. The Concept of Access to Justice
The extent to which citizens have access to justice in a broad sense
depends on the fulfillment of four principal tasks of civil procedure:
conflict resolution, compensation, and access to justice (reparation);
16. It should here be noted that there are no punitive damages in Swedish law.
17. Thus, since January 1, 2000, decision-making in Swedish environmental law cases is es-
sentially transferred from administrative agencies to newly installed environmental courts.
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behavior modification (prevention—including deterrence); precedent-
building, legal development, etc.; and procedural and social economy.
It is only by the fulfillment of all these functions that the aims and pur-
poses that underlie substantive law can be fully realized, thereby giving
people access to justice.
Conflict resolution, compensation, and access to justice refer to
the function of legal proceedings to protect, in individual cases, the in-
terests and objectives manifested by substantive legal rules.  They re-
late to the requirement that the system of rules should offer a real and
equal opportunity for everyone to have legal conflicts resolved in an
expert and impartial manner and to be able to enforce well-founded
claims.  Thus, a procedural system should provide an easily accessible
decision-making organ and procedure that is expeditious, inexpensive,
and simple.
Part of this also implies the protection and satisfaction of the pub-
lic interest in accordance with the intention of the legislature and the
social function of the law.  Private and public interests often coincide
and the satisfaction of one is also to the benefit of the other.  Develop-
ments tend toward a merger of private and public interests.18  Legal ar-
eas—substantive and procedural—that were once held apart are now
integrated to a greater extent.  State and municipal supervisory and
control functions must be complemented with resources from private
legal subjects.  The task of protecting public interests and group inter-
ests becomes increasingly a matter for the individual as well (citizen en-
forcement).
At the general level, the procedural system, and the proceedings
themselves, have the effect of controlling peoples’ behavior in many
ways.  This effect is usually called behavior modification.  By giving
support to the underlying purpose of substantive legal rules, the proc-
ess of administering justice plays a part in the whole of the legal sys-
tem’s influence on the evolution of morals.  The prospect of being sued
may also be a deterrent, in economic or other terms, both individually
(for the unsuccessful defendant) and generally (for those who are or
could be in a corresponding situation).
In order for the legal rules to operate as a behavior modifier, real-
istic prospects of turning the content of the rules into practical use are
required.  Those who rely on a normative command must have real ac-
cess to an apparatus by which they may compel recognition of their
18. See ROBERTH NORDH, Talerätt i miljömål [Legal Standing in Environmental Law]
(With a Summary in English), Chs. 16, 19 (1999)(on file with author).
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rights.  One cannot rely on everyone’s feeling that they are under a
moral duty to always obey the law.
The risk of being drawn into litigation thus plays an important role
as an inducement to voluntarily comply with the rules laid down for the
legal system.  The procedural system is a fundamental element in the
establishment of norms as a means of control.  In themselves, the pos-
sibility of going to court and litigating have the effect of modifying be-
havior, both in individual cases and more generally.  However, in order
to affect prevention, it is not necessary that many cases be brought to
the courts.  The fact that there is access to effective procedural instru-
ments has, in itself, a discouraging effect.
Another function of civil proceedings is to give rise to precedents,
legal development, etc.  Modern legislative technique, with its use of
framework laws and general clauses, has brought with it a greater need
for guidance by means of judicial precedents.  It is often difficult for the
legislative procedure to keep pace with scientific progress.  Deficiencies
in the legal system appear, and, as a consequence, protection afforded
by the rule of law to private citizens is incapacitated.  In a rapidly
changing world it is important that, besides the legislature, there is a
strong and independent institution that can carry legal development
further, in harmony with the general development of society.
For these reasons it is important that the courts be able to direct
the processes of precedent-building and supplementing legal rules.  In
this way, the development of the law and creation of new law is ex-
pected to occur within the framework of the judicial function.
The limitation of costs for the parties and the public is often of
great importance to the procedural system’s total functional success.
An expensive and complicated litigation procedure obviously inhibits
the propensity of private persons to litigate and, far too often, ad-
versely affects the unsuccessful party to the litigation.  Inadequacies in
the enforcement of legal sanctions create an opportunity for behavior
that conflicts with public objectives and interests.  Behavior that may
appear free of risk may have troublesome psychological effects.  Un-
ethical business practices or the non-observance of environmental re-
quirements are regarded as necessary to the conduct of profitable op-
erations.  The breach of rules by others excuses one’s own excesses.
Enormous social costs, which are often extremely difficult to quantify,
may be incurred as a result of the deterioration of the environment, un-
fair competition, etc.
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B. Ways of Strengthening Access to Justice
There are several measures that can be used to ensure that citizens
have adequate access to justice.19  Among these are rules on costs, legal
aid, legal expenses insurance and other kinds of insurance, joined par-
ties, test cases, state and private boards, and supervisory and monitor-
ing activities, as well as penalization.
In recent decades, the procedural system in Sweden has been re-
formed on several occasions in order to make the process less compli-
cated, curtail the formalities, and reduce the expense.  In particular, the
aim of reducing costs for the parties may be said to be the underlying
goal for the so-called Small Claims Act of 1974, the provisions of which
have now largely been incorporated into the Code of Judicial Proce-
dure.20
Thus, in small claims cases there is a no-fee rule on costs.21  This is
an exception to the Code of Judicial Procedure’s principal rule (the
“English rule”) on the distribution of costs.  Within water law, the law
relating to expropriation, and in certain other legal areas, further devia-
tions from the principal rule have been introduced.22  In a case con-
cerning a permit or compensation, for example, the person presumed
to be causing the loss bears the costs of both parties whether a permit is
given or not.
Rules relating to alternative and unbalanced distribution of costs
are effective instruments if one wishes to make it easier or more diffi-
cult for the private individual to go to court.  However, studies show
that it is almost exclusively companies that try to enforce small claims
through court procedures, while consumers feel that they cannot go to
court without counsel.  Hence, consumers do not enforce small claims.
Overall, one has to say that it is difficult to conclude that making ex-
ceptions to the rules on costs can function as a general measure to rem-
edy the inadequacies of the system regarding access to justice in respect
of group claims.
Legal aid affords private citizens the opportunity to litigate with
reduced risk regarding costs.  However, in recent years there have been
19. Cf. ACCESS TO JUSTICE. THE FLORENCE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE PROJECT. (Mauro Cap-
pelletti ed., 1978-79).
20. Rättegångsbalk [Code of Judicial Procedure](1942:740).
21. Id. at Ch. 18 § 8a.
22. See, e.g., Miljöbalk [Environmental Code] (1988:808) Ch. 25 § 2; Expropriationslag
[Law on Expropriation] (1972:719) Ch. 7 § 1 and Lag om rättegång i arbetstvister [Law About
the Procedure in Labor Law Disputes] (1974:371).
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reforms in Sweden, which have reduced access to legal aid23 and forced
people to insure themselves privately against litigation costs.  Further-
more, legal aid facilitates the pursuit of small claims only to a limited
degree; the applicant has to contribute to his own costs in proportion to
his income, and legal aid does not cover the counterparty’s costs.24
Litigation concerning group claims often results in substantial costs for
counsel and for providing evidence.  The defendant’s assessment of a
reasonable cost threshold is made from the standpoint of the aggregate
amount he may have to pay to all members of the group.  A consider-
able investment of resources may therefore be justified, the cost of
which is also alleviated by tax deductions for costs incurred.  For the
plaintiff, the risks associated with costs may easily be so formidable
that litigation does not appear to be a realistic alternative.
Legal expenses insurance offers better protection than legal aid in
these respects, as it also covers the liability to pay the opponent’s costs.
However, in the case of minor claims involving complicated legal and
evidential issues, the deductible is often a sufficient obstacle to the
commencement of proceedings.  Insurance indemnity is also usually
limited to a certain sum, which limits the value of insurance in certain
cases.  Also, as a matter of principle, it is not satisfactory that access to
justice for private citizens depends on whether or not they have legal
expenses insurance, and on conditions attached to the insurance, such
as the deductible and entitlement to legal representation.  It is mainly
due to these arguments that the recent legal aid reforms in Sweden,
mentioned above, have been heavily criticized.25  It must be a public re-
sponsibility to ensure that the economically weak are able to enforce
their rights.  Private financing alternatives may facilitate the suit and
enforcement of claims by a private citizen, but these should not be a
prerequisite.
Joinder of parties and test cases both provide a means of reducing
costs to the advantage of the parties and the courts.  Joined actions also
result in the court’s having a broader and more comprehensive infor-
mation base for its decision, which increases the preventive and prece-
dent-building effect of suits.  None of these methods, however, is par-
ticularly suitable for claims that affect large groups of people, or for
cases in which there are internal conflicts within the group.  The formal
23. The main new reform is Rättshjälplag [Legal Aid Act] (1996:1619).
24. See id. §§ 15-20, 23-25.
25. See, e.g., Leif Gustafson, 8 ADVOKATEN [THE LAWYER] 4-5 (1995); Britt Louise Mar-
teleur-Agrell, 2 ADVOKATEN 3 (1996).
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structure of the rules of procedure also involves certain limitations in
the practical importance of this manner of proceeding.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) such as boards, mediation,
and mini-trials fills an important role by offering an expeditious and
simple procedure as an alternative to judicial examination.  It reduces
the burden on the courts in relation to a considerable number of dis-
putes.  The power of ADR is, however, limited in certain respects.  The
binding force of its decisions is often dependent on the free will of the
parties, so as an effective remedy against disreputable behavior, ADR
alone seldom constitutes a realistic alternative.  Furthermore, as a mat-
ter of principle, the inadequacies in access to justice relating to com-
pensation, prevention, or precedent-building, neither can nor ought to
be remedied by measures outside the courts’ administration.  Extra-
judicial institutions may supplement but should not replace judicial ex-
amination, which must remain the backbone of the system.
Government agencies occupy a strong position in safeguarding
compliance with the law.  As representatives of the public interest, the
authorities have been involved in the influence and formation of legal
developments made in several central legal areas.  Their power to in-
tervene and provide private individuals with support in civil legal dis-
putes is, however, extremely limited in Sweden.26  The effectiveness of
the authorities’ operations depends on access to state and municipal
funds and qualified personnel.  There is a risk that they will have nei-
ther the funds nor the qualified personnel required if they alone must
continue to take care of common interests.  Monitoring, inspection, su-
pervision, and other similar activities that do not involve the exercise of
public power must be distributed among several coordinated organs,
both private and public.  It is necessary to adopt a pluralistic view of
the roles of individual persons and society in relation to the taking of
measures to enforce the interests that the legal system seeks to safe-
guard.
Penalization is traditionally viewed as an effective means of con-
trol, but the effects are strongly questioned in contemporary public de-
bate.  The possibility in Sweden to attach small claims to prosecutions
greatly facilitates the enforcement of small financial claims.27  However,
as a result of the stringent evidential requirements that should be main-
26. See, e.g., Lag (1997:379) om försörksverksamhet avseende medverkan av konsument
ombudsmannen i vissa tvister [Law (1997:379) About the Participation of the Consumer Om-
budsman in Disputes of a Certain Kind].
27. See Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 20, at Ch. 22.
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tained, it is seldom that penalization constitutes a good foundation for
claims for damages.
C. The Need for Reforms
Many factors indicate that the procedural system does not always
meet all of the demands made on it.  All of the indications are that
there is a significant number of legally well-founded claims which never
obtain actual recognition.  It is too troublesome and expensive for the
private person to go to court, particularly for a claim of small value or
to pursue a claim purely with the aim of creating a precedent.  Social,
psychological, and other extra-legal factors deter people from taking
legal measures.  Due to limited financial and staff resources, the
authorities cannot intervene in all cases where it is justified.  Proce-
dural rules pose restrictions on or make it difficult for one party in liti-
gation to act on behalf of others.28  Further, if litigation concerning
group claims is commenced, there are no effective means to deal with
mass proceedings.
Access to legal aid and legal expenses insurance, rules for small
claims cases, joined actions, and test cases have only partly remedied
these defects in the system that limit access to justice for group claims.
Extra-judicial mechanisms for the resolution of disputes and special in-
surance solutions do not offer a satisfactory alternative to examination
by the court, yet they are important complements that, fortunately, re-
duce the burden on the courts in many matters.
Thus, there are many reasons that together give rise to gaps in the
legal system and permit the occurrence of unchallenged violations of
legal rights.  For the private individual, this incapacity to respond leads
to legal losses; in some cases these may be small, but in other cases they
may be so large that they threaten the survival of private economies.
Public interests, such as the equal treatment of all citizens, free compe-
tition on equal terms, and environmental conservation, suffer.  Central
fields of law are adversely affected by being starved of precedents, and
they also lack development in the law and creation of law through judi-
cial practice.
There is no evidence to suggest that the procedural system will ful-
fill its purpose more successfully in the future unless reform measures
are taken.  In fact, one may expect that demands to ensure effective ac-
28. See, e.g., PER HENRIK LINDBLOM, Processhinder. Om skillnaden mellan formell och
materiell rätt inom civilprocessen, särskilt vid bristande talerätt [Procedural Hindrances. On the
Distinction Between Procedural and Substantive Law, with Special Reference to the Question
of Standing in Civil Procedure] 214-15 (1974); NORDH, supra note 18, at 424-25.
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cess to justice for consumers will increase.  European legal integration
will, in some respects, probably result in a transition towards a new
type of legislative technique in which judicial practice will play an in-
creasingly important role.  The restriction of state and municipal in-
volvement to inspection and supervisory functions, together with a par-
tial transfer from prior control to market control, presents a greater
demand on citizens to respond.  The internationalization of trade and
other activities directed towards citizens gives rise to new legal ques-
tions, both substantive and procedural.  Continued technological and
other scientific development leads to further complexity and difficulties
in understanding the causes underlying the circumstances from which
rights and duties emanate.  There will be an increased need for time-
consuming and costly investigations to determine whether a legally
well-founded claim exists.
The concept of the individualistic two-party dispute, which in prin-
ciple forms the basis for all civil litigation, is ill-suited to combat the
forms of mass encroachment resulting from modern society’s tendency
towards mass production, mass distribution, mass information, and
mass consumption.  It would be unrealistic to expect that everyone
should have the opportunity to take legal steps to the extent necessary.
Also, the traditionally structured system copes badly with claims in
which legal encroachments affect many without giving rise to individual
civil law claims and in cases where it is difficult to identify the people
injured.  Furthermore, there are no legal institutions in which proce-
dural rules have been adapted to satisfy claims deriving from contem-
porary principles, such as the right of everyone to a healthy environ-
ment, healthy food, and the protection of civil rights.  The inadequacies
are not limited to the occasional loss of legal rights by citizens or the
State.  The fact that mass infringement of legal rights may pass unchal-
lenged means that the procedural system does not satisfy its other func-
tions of prevention, precedent-building, and creation of new law.
In conclusion, there exists, in today’s society, a manifest need for
reforms.  Forms of safeguarding group actions other than those en-
compassed by traditional procedural mechanisms must be created.
In order to improve the present system with respect to providing
public access to justice, it is necessary that all or at least the majority of
people who have the same or similar claims be afforded a realistic op-
portunity to pursue and enforce their rights.  It is not necessary that all
legal infringements in society should be challenged.  The fact is, how-
ever, that it is not possible to accomplish the desired modification of
behavior if there is no means to correct or satisfy the main part of the
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legal infringements that occur.  Only when such means exist will the in-
fluence of sanctions provide an adequate deterrent.
Providing improved economic means to enable everyone to go to
court is not always an adequate measure.  Sometimes the passive reac-
tion is the result of other legal and non-legal factors.  Also, if the ma-
jority of injured parties were to commence proceedings, it would not be
practically possible for the courts to deal with them within existing
rules of procedure.  The simultaneous reaction of a vast mass of injured
parties would paralyze the administration of a district court.
It is thus not possible, within the framework of the existing system
of litigation, to combine the need for mass action with the requirement
of an expeditious, inexpensive, and uncomplicated procedure.  Meas-
ures intended to facilitate individuals’ reference to court or other tri-
bunals are consequently not effective remedies in themselves.  As is the
case in several other legal systems, rules must be introduced into
Swedish law that will permit representative actions in court.
This was the conclusion drawn by the Swedish Commission on
Group Actions and is the stance taken by the Ministry of Justice in
Sweden.29  As mentioned above, the Swedish Government is at the
moment considering a proposal for an Act on Group Proceedings with
the intention of presenting a proposition for legislation before the Par-
liament in the beginning of 2001.30
In the next section, I will give a short presentation of the Swedish
proposal as it stands today.31
IV.  THE SWEDISH PROPOSAL FOR AN ACT ON GROUP
PROCEEDINGS
A. The Institution of Proceedings, etc.
An action for a group shall be instituted in accordance with the
Code of Judicial Procedure’s rules concerning applications to com-
mence actions.32  The application shall be treated in the usual manner
in relation to the Court’s consideration of prerequisites to the institu-
29. See supra notes 14-15.
30. Just before this Article is to be published, the time for presenting a Government Bill
has been postponed until the end of this year.  See supra note 15.
31. Author has just recently (March 2001) been asked by the Ministry of Justice to make
further considerations on some issues and present his views before this summer.  It is essentially
the issue of whether membership in the group shall be decided by an opt-in or an opt-out model
that the Author has been asked to look further into.
32. See Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 20, at Ch. 42.
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tion of proceedings and issue of the summons, etc.  Thus, there will be
no rules on any special leave to commence proceedings (certification)
as is common in other countries that have a system for group actions.33
It may transpire during the conduct of an ordinary case that a rep-
resentative form of action would be a more appropriate procedural al-
ternative.  For example, a party who tries to pursue and enforce a claim
may learn of others with the same or similar claims.  In such cases there
are good practical and principle-based reasons that could prompt plain-
tiffs to consider having their individual actions extended to become an
action for the group.  It is therefore suggested that the plaintiff be given
the opportunity to make a special application to the court requesting
that a suit be enlarged to a group action.
B. Forum
The general forum rules of the Code of Judicial Procedure are
based on the principle that the district courts are of equal competence.34
The Swedish Commission suggested that this should also apply in the
application of the Act on Group Litigation.35  In the revised proposal,
however, group litigation is concentrated in a few specialized courts.
The reason for this is that many district courts are so small that they are
not suitable to deal with group litigation.  A group action would, in
these courts, severely disrupt the handling of other proceedings.
C. Standing
The proposal intends that it should be possible to commence indi-
vidual group actions (class actions), public group actions, and organiza-
tional group actions.36  Different organs will be able to complement and
assist each other.  The form that best suits the particular case may be
selected.
Regarding the issue of which legal subjects should be afforded
standing to pursue a group action, the proposal suggests that a person
who is a member of the group may commence individual group ac-
tions (class actions).37  This means that the plaintiff shall have stand-
ing to be a party to litigation with respect to one of the claims to
which the action relates.  It is considered that someone with a per-
33. E.g., class actions in Ontario, Canada and New South Wales, Australia.  See Watson,
supra note 11; Clark & Harris, supra note 11.
34. See Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 20, at Ch. 10.
35. See SOU 1994:151 Part B 95-96.
36. See id. at 104-05.
37. See id. at 105-06.
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sonal interest in the case may be expected to expend the necessary
time and effort to pursue his right and thereby the rights of the mem-
bers.
It can be argued that this does not apply to a person who has only
a small claim.  On the other hand, if there is no such person willing to
take action, small claims can be enforced by the use of public actions or
organizational actions.
The organizational action means, as with the public group action,
that someone is given standing to sue without the dispute in any way
affecting the plaintiff’s own legal interests.  This is contrary to the nor-
mal requirement regarding standing.  The need and suitability of the
introduction of rules on organizational actions have been based on ob-
servations made by the Commission on the circumstances that exist in
various fields.38  The result is that the proposal on organizational ac-
tions is restricted to two areas of law, namely consumer law and envi-
ronmental law.  In the field of consumer law, a group action may be in-
stituted by an affiliation of consumers or wage-earners in disputes with
a tradesman relating to goods, services or other utilities offered by the
tradesman, in the course of business, to consumers primarily for private
use.
Within the field of environmental law, non-profit associations
dedicated to nature conservation and environmental protection cur-
rently have the right to appeal judgments under the Environment Code
without having a private interest in the case.39  These organizations, to-
gether with professional federations in the fishing, farming, reindeer,
and forestry industries, will be given the right to commence proceed-
ings concerning injunctions and compensation for environmental im-
pairment.40  While the right to appeal judgments under the Environ-
mental Code is restricted to organizations that meet certain conditions,
the right to commence group actions will be open to all non-profit or-
ganizations having the objectives mentioned above.
An authority stipulated by the government may commence public
group actions.41  It is not considered possible to identify in advance the
situations in which a state group action would be a more suitable alter-
native than an individual group action or an organizational action.  It
should therefore be left to the government to lay down, by administra-
tive regulations, the extent to which an authority may commence group
38. See id. Part C, Appendix B.
39. See Environmental Code, supra note 22, at Ch. 16 § 13.
40. Cf. SOU 1994:151 Part B 108-09.
41. Id. at 116-17.
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actions.  The right of action shall not be primary nor exclude others
from commencing proceedings.
D. Special Conditions for an Action
Group litigation is not intended to be a substitute for individual
two-party litigation where the latter functions effectively and meets the
purposes demanded. The representative action should be employed
only where the need for legal procedural alternatives is not satisfied
within the framework of the current procedural system or where action
for or against a group may be expected to lead to tangible procedural
economic benefits. Against this background it is necessary to impose
certain special conditions for cases when an action for a group should
be permitted.
One such requirement is that there should be a group that has
been adequately defined with regard to the circumstances in the case.
It is not considered necessary that the term “group” be defined in the
Act. The extent to which the number of group members and their
identity must be known will depend on the circumstances of the case,
for example, on the nature of the claims, the demand for relief, and
the cause of action.
Another prerequisite for an action is that the suit should be
based on one or more facts or questions of law that are common or
similar in the claims of all members of the group.42 However, this does
not mean that there cannot be facts that are specific for some mem-
bers’ claims or that common facts must outnumber individual facts.
In most situations it will be necessary to balance common issues
against individual factors in order to decide whether a group action is
suitable at all, and if it is more suitable than individual actions. The
balancing must be based not on quantity but on quality. Emphasis
must be put on issues such as the evidence, costs, and so forth that are
linked to the test of the different kinds of facts.
A further requirement is that group litigation should be the best
available procedural alternative;43 this requirement is often called
“superiority.”  When judging the pros and cons of group litigation
compared to other alternatives, it is essential to separate different
kinds of claims.  While some claims are individually recoverable, oth-
ers are individually non-recoverable or even nonviable.44  There can
42. This prerequisite is often called commonality.  Cf. SOU 1994:151 Part B at 55 f.
43. Cf. SOU 1994: 151 Part B at 66 f.
44. See Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1356 (1976).
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only be a comparison made to individual litigation if such litigation is
a realistic alternative. In other cases, a group action will in practice be
the only alternative available for an individual to enforce his right.
Furthermore, the commencement of group litigation should also
require the court to consider whether and how the case may be dealt
with effectively and purposefully.  In this context, the practical prob-
lems that the court may face in allowing a group action to be com-
menced must especially be taken into consideration.
A special prerequisite is that the group’s representative must be
considered to be suitable to represent the group.45  The judgment of
the plaintiff’s ability to represent the group shall be based on all cir-
cumstances that will or might affect his ability to ensure that each
member of the group will have his claim tried as well as if he had liti-
gated on his own.  Of special importance is the requirement that the
plaintiff has the means to pursue the case and that he has no personal
interest that conflicts with the interests of the group.
The group representative is under a duty to protect the interests of
the group in an adequate manner.46  He shall, at the request of mem-
bers of the group, provide information concerning circumstances of
importance to the members’ rights.  On important issues he shall afford
members the opportunity to express their views, provided this may be
done without undue inconvenience.
As a further guarantee for the protection of group members in
class actions and organizational actions, it is proposed that the pro-
ceedings be conducted by an attorney.47
E. Membership in the Group48
An action for a group will automatically embrace all persons who
fit the plaintiff’s description of the group.  Membership in the group
will consequently not require any application to the court.
Those who are members of the group shall, by a personal notice or
in some other suitable way, be informed about the action and provided
with the opportunity to leave the group within a certain period after
the commencement of the action (opt-out).49  The time limit imposed
45. Cf. SOU 1994: 151 Part B at 118 f.
46. See id..
47. See id. at 125 f.
48. As I mentioned above, I recently (March 2001) have been asked by the Ministry of Jus-
tice to make further considerations on this issue and it is today not possible to say whether there
will be an opt-out or an opt-in model chosen or perhaps a mixture of them both.
49. Cf. SOU 1994: 151 part B p 162 f.
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shall be fixed by the court at the same time as it advises the members of
the group that a group action has been commenced.  Members who re-
tire from the group will not be bound by a future decision in the case.
The members of a group shall not be parties to the action unless
they have intervened in the group litigation.  This does not mean that a
member shall be simply considered as any other person who is not a
party.  The very nature of the form of action means that members shall
be regarded as parties, inter alia, with respect to recognition of pending
actions (and a consequent bar on duplication of proceedings), eviden-
tial questions, and execution of the court’s decision.  Further, the
court’s determination enters into legal force vis-à-vis the members as if
they had sued personally.
F. Individual Circumstances
In group litigation, issues relating to legal and evidential facts may
arise which are of importance to certain, but not all, claims subject to
the action.  This does not of itself mean that the issues must be dealt
with specially during the litigation.  On the contrary, it is usual, when
several cases are amalgamated, that facts are discovered which distin-
guish the cases, although this does not result in the court partitioning
the proceedings.  In the vast majority of cases it will be possible to deal
with individual issues in a similar way within the framework of the
group action.
Sometimes, however, an expeditious, inexpensive, and simple pro-
cess of cases is promoted when individual issues in dispute are dealt
with in a special manner.  This can usually be achieved by limiting the
action to an application for a declaratory judgment.50  However, it
ought also to be possible with an action brought for performance.51
Therefore, it is proposed that if the individually disputed issues are
held in common or are similar for several members of the group, the
court shall be empowered to appoint a special group representative to
conduct the action on behalf of these members.52  This would in effect
mean that a subsidiary group would be established with its own group
representative.
Another proposed method is that the court be empowered to ad-
journ the determination of a particular question or part of the matter
and determine the remaining part of the case by what is called a “spe-
50. See Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 20, at Ch. 13 § 2.
51. See id. § 1.
52. Cf. SOU 1994: 151 Part B at 200 f.
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cial partial judgment.”53  The plaintiff or the group members shall be
ordered to request trial of the postponed issue within a certain period.
If this request is not presented, the action will be dismissed unless it is
obvious that the suit is well-founded.54
G. Suspension of Group Litigation
Group litigation may be suspended in two ways other than by the
issue of judgment.  The plaintiff’s suit may be dismissed by reason of an
impediment to the action that arises or is first observed when the proc-
ess of the issue has commenced.55  The plaintiff may also withdraw his
action for the group.56
In such a situation, it would not be efficient to immediately sus-
pend the court’s examination of the claims encompassed in a group ac-
tion.  An abrupt conclusion of the process would result in serious pro-
cedural economic losses and other inconvenience.  In order to prevent
this, a rule should be introduced whereby the court’s examination may
continue, but in another form.
The rule essentially states that the court should afford members of
the group the opportunity of entering into the proceedings and con-
ducting the action for themselves regarding their representative claims.
The court would thus be able to decide that a member’s suit should be
transformed into what is known as a small claim case.
H. Settlement
The authority of the group representatives to act on behalf of the
members of the group is strictly procedural.  Representation does not
mean that a member of the group assigns his respective civil law right
to settle the subject of the dispute.  However, a special exception to this
fundamental principle is introduced whereby the group representative
is empowered to make settlements with the opponent on behalf of the
group.57  The settlement will be binding for members of the group only
on order of the court.58
53. SOU 1994: 151 Part B at 317 f.
54. See id. at 624 f.
55. See id. at 212 f.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 295 f.
58. See id.
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I. Litigation Costs
In group litigation, the representative of the group will be the
plaintiff.  In that capacity, he will be entitled to an award of litigation
costs by the opponent, but he also risks having to pay the opponent’s
costs if the group loses the case (the “English rule”).  Thus, the rules
for costs within the Code of Judicial Procedure will apply fully.
A group member shall bear the usual responsibility for the oppo-
nent’s litigation costs only where the member has intervened in the liti-
gation.59  Otherwise, a group member should be made liable for litiga-
tion costs only under special circumstances, for example, if the member
has caused unnecessary litigation or has been guilty of carelessness or
neglect.60
It is also proposed that a group representative and an attorney
shall have the opportunity to reach an agreement on fees, meaning that
the fees for the attorney shall be determined having regard to the ex-
tent to which the group members’ claims are satisfied.  Such agree-
ments are known as risk-agreements whereby fees are contingent on
liability but, in contrast with U.S. practice, are not linked to the size of
the award.  The fee will be based on an hourly rate.
J. Appeals
Briefly, the following rules concerning appeals in group litigation
are proposed.  A decision to allow a group action to commence may be
appealed depending on the discretion of the court.61  A judgment may
be appealed on behalf of a group by the group representative or, if he
does not appeal, by a member of the group subject to the appeal.62
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
An efficient procedural system has to fulfill several functions that
can be sorted into four main groups: reparation, prevention, prece-
dent-building, and procedural economy.  Deficiencies in these func-
tions concerning the procedural protection of civil and public rights
may lead to serious consequences.
The fact that well-founded claims are not being enforced can be
explained by one or more of four major factors.  One is that there is a
disproportion between the value of the claim and the cost of enforc-
59. See id. at 411.
60. Cf. Code of Judicial Procedure, supra note 20, at Ch. 18 § 3, 6.
61. Cf. SOU 1994:151 part B at 143 f.
62. See id. at 335 f.
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ing it by court procedure.  Another reason is that due to economic,
psychological, or other non-legal factors, the individual claim holder
does not know that he has a claim, or he lacks the will and power
needed to enforce his right.  A third obstacle is that procedural rules
and principles limit opportunities to act on behalf of someone else.  A
fourth factor is that the authorities have been given too much respon-
sibility in relation to their financial and staff resources, while at the
same time the individual citizens have become passive.
There are at least four alternative measures to fill the holes in the
procedural protection of well-founded claims.  One is to strengthen
the authorities’ financial resources and thereby increase public con-
trol.  Another measure is to more strongly support alternative dispute
resolution.  A third alternative is to develop existing procedural
methods for dealing with mass claims, such as joinder of parties and
test cases, for example.  A fourth solution is to introduce a represen-
tative action.  Although none of these alternatives should be ex-
cluded, studies in Sweden and in other countries show that group ac-
tion is the superior method for remedying inadequacies regarding
access to justice for mass claims.63  Group action has a great degree of
flexibility.  Thus, it may be structured according to the circumstances
so that
a) compensation is offered to those whose rights have been en-
croached upon, but who do not have any realistic possibility
of enforcing their rights,
b) the judicial system exercises a behavior modification function
in cases where the aggregate injurious effects are extensive
but the individual claims are small, so that no one is inclined
to take upon themselves the burden of pursuing and enforc-
ing them,
c) the courts have sufficient information to make the broad bal-
ancing of interests which are a prerequisite for them to fulfill
their function in relation to precedent-building, the develop-
ment of law and making of new law,
d) and common or similar issues in group actions relating to
evidence and law are examined in an expeditious, inexpen-
sive, and uncomplicated manner, in order that the courts and
parties save time and costs.
63. See generally Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court, Australian Law Reform
Commission, Report No. 46 at 26-34 (1988); Report on Class Actions, Ontario Law Reform
Commission, Vol. I-III 101-212 (1982).
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This does not mean that group actions are the final solution to all
problems in dealing with mass claims.  However, the availability of
group actions will manifestly improve the capacity of the procedural
system to satisfy the problems presented by group claims.
